Глава 3 - При Николае I

Chapter 3: Under Nicholas I

Nicholas I was very energetic in his approach to Russian Jews. Sources note that during his reign, half of all legislative acts concerning Jews, from the time of Alexei Mikhailovich to the death of Alexander II, were issued. Moreover, the Tsar himself delved into this legislation and directed it¹.

In Jewish historiography, it is firmly established that Nicholas I's policy was exceptionally harsh and grim. However, his personal intervention was not always detrimental to Jews. For example, one of the earliest issues he inherited was the "Velizh case" — an accusation against local Jews of the ritual murder of a Christian boy, which had been revived by Alexander I just before his death (on his way to Taganrog). This case then dragged on for 10 years. According to the Jewish Encyclopedia, "undoubtedly, the acquittal… was largely due to the Tsar, who sought justice despite opposition from those he trusted." In another well-known case involving accusations against Jews (the "Mogilev riots"), "the Tsar readily embraced the truth; having initially punished the local Jewish population in a moment of anger, he did not hesitate to acknowledge his mistake"². When issuing the acquittal verdict in the Velizh case, Nicholas wrote that he did so "due to the obscurity of legal arguments, no other decision could follow," but he added: "I do not and cannot have an internal conviction that the murder was not perpetrated by Jews. Repeated instances of similar killings with the same indications", but always a lack of evidence, led him to suspect that there exists among Jews some fanatical sect, "unfortunately, among us Christians, there are sometimes such sects which are no less horrific and incomprehensible"³. "Nicholas I and many of his close associates continued to believe that certain groups of Jews practiced ritual murders"⁴. And "owing to the fact that for several years the Tsar was under the heavy impression of the blood libel… a prejudice was reinforced in him, as if Jewish doctrine posed a danger to the Christian population"⁵.

Nicholas saw a danger in the possibility of Jews converting Christians to the Jewish faith. From the 18th century, there was still a memory of the notorious case of the conversion to Judaism by Captain Voznitsyn, an officer in the imperial service. In Russia, "from the second half of the 18th century, groups of 'Judaizers' became quite widespread." In 1823, the Minister of the Interior reported on "the widespread spread of the 'Judaizing' heresy in Russia, estimating its adherents at 20,000 people." Persecutions began, under which "many sectarians formally returned to the bosom of the Orthodox Church, while secretly continuing to observe the customs of their sects"⁶.

"All this led to the legislation concerning Jews during the era of Nicholas I taking on… a religious hue"⁷, and this influenced the decisions and actions of Nicholas I regarding Jews, as well as his persistent motive in prohibiting Jews from employing Christian servants, particularly Christian wet-nurses, because "serving Jews offends and weakens the Christian faith in women." (However, despite repeated prohibitions—these directives were never "fully implemented… the service continued")⁸.

The first vigorous measure concerning Jews that Nicholas I undertook at the beginning of his reign was to equalize Jews with the Russian population in bearing all state duties, namely: to subject them to the universal personal conscription duty, which they had not known since their incorporation into Russia. Previously, Jewish townsmen could replace a recruit by paying 500 rubles⁹ — this measure was driven not solely by the state consideration of equalizing the burdens of the population (taxes were still not being paid promptly by Jewish communities, and Jews were also moving to Russia from Galicia, where they were subject to military duty). It was motivated not only by the idea that conscription "would reduce the number of Jews not engaged in productive labor" (since soldiers were then enlisted for 25 years), but also by the notion that removing the recruit from the dense Jewish milieu would facilitate his integration into the general state order of life, and possibly even into Orthodoxy¹⁰. — It was precisely the development of these considerations that led to a significant intensification of the burden for Jews by gradually increasing both the number of those called up and lowering their age of eligibility.

It cannot be said that Nicholas I was able to introduce the decree on Jewish conscription without resistance. On the contrary, delays were immediately evident at all levels of implementation. There were debates in the Council of Ministers about whether it was ethical to adopt such a measure "to limit the multitude of Jews" and "the recognized indecency of taking people for money," as Finance Minister E.F. Cancrin put it. The kahals made every possible effort to protect the Jewish population from this threatening measure or to somehow delay it. When Nicholas, frustrated by the delays, ordered that a final report be presented to him in the shortest possible time — "this directive, apparently, prompted the kahals to intensify their behind-the-scenes efforts to stall the proceedings. And, it seems, they managed to sway some of the officials to their side." And… — "the report did not reach its destination." At the very top of the imperial apparatus, "this mysterious episode," concludes Y.I. Gessen, "hardly [happened] without the participation of the kahal." The report was never found later, and Nicholas, not having received it, introduced conscription for Jews by decree in 1827¹¹. (And from 1836, equality in receiving orders for distinguished Jewish soldiers¹²).

From conscription, complete exemptions were granted to "merchants of all guilds, residents of agricultural colonies, guild masters, mechanics in factories, rabbis, and all Jews who had secondary or higher education"¹³. This led many Jewish townsmen to try to reclassify themselves as merchants—a move opposed by the townspeople's community, "as it depleted the tax and conscription resources of the community." Merchants, meanwhile, tried to reduce their financial responsibility for the tax payments of the townspeople. This exacerbated relations between the Jewish merchant class and the townspeople— "at that time, the merchant class, having grown and become wealthier, already had solid connections in the capital circles." The Grodno kahal initiated a petition in Petersburg for the division of the Jewish people into 4 "classes"—merchants, townspeople, craftsmen, and farmers, and for each class not to be responsible for the others¹⁴. (In this idea, proposed in the early 1830s by the kahals themselves, one can see the impetus for the future Nicholaevian "reassessment" of 1840, which was perceived as threatening by Jews.)

The task of carrying out the conscription in this unaccounted and undefined Jewish mass was entrusted to the kahals. The kahal "placed the entire burden of conscription on the backs of the poor," as "the departure from the community of its poorest members was seen as desirable, whereas the loss of wealthier individuals threatened communal ruin." Many kahals petitioned the provincial authorities (but were denied) for the right "not to adhere to the rules about conscription queues" in order to be able to hand over "those who idle about, do not pay taxes, and are troublesome due to the disorders they cause," so that "the owners… who bear all the community's burdens, [would not] have to provide recruits from their own families"—but by doing so, the kahals would also gain a means to exert control over community members¹⁵.

However, with the introduction of regular conscription duty among Jews, the men subject to conscription began to flee and were not provided in full number. Additionally, it was discovered that even with a significant reduction in the monetary tax required from Jewish communities, it still continued to be underpaid. In 1829, Nicholas I agreed to the Grodno petition to take Jewish recruits in excess of the allotment in some provinces to cover tax arrears. ("In 1830, a Senate decree was adopted, according to which an additional adult recruit from the kahal offset 1,000 rubles, a child 500 rubles"¹⁶.) True, due to the excessive eagerness of the governors, the measure was soon halted, although "Jewish communities themselves began asking the government to take recruits in payment of arrears." In government circles, "this proposal was met unsympathetically, as it was easy to foresee that [it] would open a new field for abuses by the kahals"¹⁷. — However, the idea was seemingly maturing on both sides.

Hessen writes about the increase in conscription duty for Jews compared to the rest of the population, stating that it was "a glaring anomaly" in Russian legislation, because generally in Russia, "legislation concerning Jews was alien to the tendency to impose greater duties on them than on other subjects"¹⁸.

Nicholas I's straightforward mind, prone to drawing easily discernible perspectives (as legend has it, like the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway laid out with a ruler), continued his insistence on transforming the segregated Jews into ordinary Russian subjects, and ideally into Orthodox Christians. He extended the idea of Jewish conscription into the concept of Jewish cantonists. "Cantonists" (a term from 1805) referred to an institution that housed underage soldier’s sons (to alleviate their fathers' 25-year service) and continued the "military orphan divisions" created under Peter the Great. These were essentially state-supported schools that provided the boys with technical training for further military service, which now seemed to officials entirely suitable for Jewish boys, desirable for their early and prolonged separation from a Jewish environment. With the path through the cantonists in mind, the decree of 1827 "allowed Jewish communities, at their discretion, to send one minor in place of one adult", starting from age 12¹⁹ (i.e., before the Jewish marital age). The New Jewish Encyclopedia calls this measure "the severest blow". However, permission did not mean mandatory conscription from age 12; it was not "the introduction of conscription duty for Jewish boys"²⁰, as incorrectly stated by the Encyclopedia and as became established in literature about Jews in Russia, and later in public memory. Kahals found such a replacement convenient and widely used it, sending "orphans, children of widows (sometimes bypassing the law—only sons), and the poor" often "on behalf of a rich family’s quota"²¹.

Later, from the age of 18, cantonists transitioned into regular military service, which was lengthy at that time. However, it's important to remember that this service wasn't strictly barrack-based; soldiers could marry, live with families, engage in other occupations, and upon completing their military service, they gained the right to settle permanently in the internal provinces of the Empire. Nevertheless, undoubtedly, for Jewish soldiers who remained faithful to their Jewish faith and rituals, it was painful to violate the Sabbath and dietary laws.

For the young Jews who ended up as cantonists, being torn from their native environment, it was understandably difficult to withstand the pressure from educators (who were also incentivized by rewards for successfully converting their charges), especially during lessons that included the "Law of God" in addition to Russian literacy and arithmetic. Rewards were given to those who converted, and there was resentment among the adolescents towards their community for having handed them over to the recruiters. However, the resilience of the Jewish character and a natural loyalty to their religion from a young age countered these pressures.

Needless to say, such measures of conversion to Christianity were not Christian in spirit and did not achieve their intended goals. However, tales of brutally violent conversions to Orthodoxy, with threats of death to the cantonists and even mass drownings in rivers of those who refused baptism—stories that circulated in public over the following decades—are among the fabrications. As the old Jewish Encyclopedia writes, this "folk legend" about the supposed drowning of several hundred Jewish cantonists originated from a German newspaper report stating that "when once 800 cantonists were driven into the water for baptism, two of them drowned"²².

According to statistical data from the military registration archives of the General Staff²³, during the years 1847-1854, which saw the highest recruitment of Jewish cantonists, they averaged 2.4% of all cantonists in Russia. This means that their share did not exceed the proportional share of the Jewish population in the country, even according to the understated data provided by the kahals for the censuses of that time.

Clearly, there was also a calculation by those who converted to Christianity to later exaggerate the degree of violence they experienced during their conversion in justifications to their fellow Jews, especially since after converting they received certain service privileges. However, "many of the converted cantonists [remained] secretly faithful to their previous religion, and some later reverted to Judaism"²⁴.

In the last years of Alexander I's reign, following a new wave of famine in Belarus (1822), another senator was sent on a mission there, and he returned with the same conclusion as Derzhavin had a quarter century earlier. Consequently, in 1823, a "Jewish Committee" composed of four ministers was established to address the question of "on what basis it would be more convenient and beneficial to establish the residence [of Jews] in the state" and "to outline everything that could contribute to the better organization of the civil status of this people." They soon realized that the task was beyond their capabilities, and in 1825 the "Jewish Committee" of ministers was replaced by a "Directorial Committee" (the fifth of its kind) — consisting of department directors, who then tackled the problem for another eight years²⁵.

Nicholas I, in his impatience, outpaced the Committee's work with his own decisions. For instance, he introduced conscription for Jews. He also set a new three-year deadline for the expulsion of Jews from the villages of the western provinces to curb their involvement in the alcohol trade—yet this measure was slowed down, halted, and eventually canceled, as it had been under his predecessor. Later, there was a prohibition on Jews who owned taverns and inns from living in them and personally handling the sale of alcoholic beverages—however, this too did not come into effect²⁶.

There was an attempt to ban Jews from another significant trade of theirs—running postal stations (and the associated inns with taverns), but this too was canceled because there were not enough other candidates to take over these services without the Jews²⁷.

In 1827, a leasing system for the alcohol trade was introduced across the Empire, and it was also found that "there was a significant drop in prices at auctions when Jews were excluded, and sometimes there was a complete lack of bidders,"—and Jews had to be allowed back into the alcohol leasing not only in towns and rural areas but even outside the Pale of Settlement. Thus, the government offloaded organizational responsibilities onto Jewish alcohol leaseholders and secured a steady income²⁸. — "Long before merchants of the first guild received the right to reside anywhere in the Empire, all leaseholders practically enjoyed the freedom of movement and lived unimpeded in the capitals and other cities outside the Pale of Settlement… From among these leaseholders emerged some prominent Jewish public figures," as previously mentioned, Litman Feigin and Evzel Ginzburg ("held the wine lease in besieged Sevastopol"; "in 1859 founded a banking house in Petersburg… the largest in Russia"; later "participated in placing Russian and foreign state loans"; founder of the dynasty of barons²⁹). — From 1848, it was also allowed for "all Jewish merchants of the first guild to hold alcohol leases even in places where Jews were not allowed permanent residence"³⁰.

The right for Jews to engage in distilling was also expanded. As we recall, since 1819 Jews had been allowed to engage in distillation in the Great Russian provinces "until the perfection of Russian craftsmen" in the field. In 1826, Nicholas ordered that such individuals be expelled back to the Pale of Settlement, but from 1827 he began to yield to private requests to keep Jewish distillers in place, for example at the state-owned factories in Irkutsk³¹.

V.S. Solovyov reflects on M.N. Katkov's thoughts: "In the Western region, the tavern business is run by Jews, but is it better in other parts of Russia?… Are the Jewish tavern keepers, who intoxicate the people and ruin and destroy the peasants, a ubiquitous phenomenon in Russia? [And] in our places, where Jews are not allowed and where an Orthodox cross-kisser or a kulak rules the tavern?"³² — Let's also hear from Leskov, an expert on Russian folk life: "In the Great Russian provinces, where Jews do not live, the number of people sentenced for drunkenness, as well as the number of crimes committed while intoxicated, is consistently much higher than the number of such cases within the Jewish settlement area. The same is true for the number of deaths from poisoning… and this has been the case not just now, but has always been so historically"³³.

Indeed, statistics indicate that while in the Western and Southern regions of the Empire there was one drinking establishment per 297 people, in the Eastern region it was one per 585. The influential newspaper of that era, "Golos," called Jewish tavern-keeping "an incurable sore" of the Western region specifically. I.G. Orshansky theoretically argues that the more frequently and densely drinking spots are placed, the less drunkenness there is. (To understand why a peasant wouldn’t be tempted if a drinking spot is right under his nose and beckoning round the clock—recall Derzhavin's comment that tavern-keepers trade even at night—versus being enticed to one far away, where he'd have to slog through the mud across a field? No, it is known: alcoholism is sustained not only by the demand for vodka but also by its supply.) — Orshansky also proves that when a Jew stands between a landlord-distiller and a drunken peasant, he objectively acts in the peasant's favor because he sells vodka cheaper, even though he also takes items as pawn. Yes, he writes, there is an opinion that Jewish tavern-keepers "have a detrimental influence on the well-being of peasants," but because in tavern-keeping they "distinguish themselves… as in all their activities, by special skill, dexterity, and energy"³⁴. — However, elsewhere, in another article in the same collection, he acknowledges the "usurious deals Jews make with peasants"; "it is true that there is much deception in their [Jewish] trade and that the Jewish profiteer, tavern-keeper, and moneylender exploits the poor population, especially the rural one"; "in dealings with the landlord the peasant is extraordinarily stubborn [about the price], but he is ridiculously submissive and trusting when dealing with a Jew, especially if the Jew has vodka under his coat"; the poverty of peasants, "the need to pay taxes, the passion for vodka… often force peasants to sell grain to Jews at a low price"³⁵. Yet even to this stark, groaning, screaming truth—Orshansky looks for mitigating arguments. But who then justifies the disease of the peasant's will?..

Despite Nicholas I's persistent energy, failures in transforming Jewish life accompanied him in many areas throughout his entire reign.

This was also the case with Jewish agriculture.

In the "Statute of Conscription Duty and Military Service for Jews" of 1827, it was stipulated for Jewish farmers, "relocated… to special lands," that they and their children would be exempt from conscription duty for 50 years (the exemption period counted from the actual beginning of "engagement in agriculture"). As soon as this statute was announced, more Jews returned to the colonies from unauthorized absences than were believed to have been absent³⁶.

К 1829 были разработаны и более подробные «правила [для] евреев-земледельцев»: и отпуск в мещане при уплате всех долгов; и разрешение отлучек до 3-х месяцев для заработков в сроки, свободные от полевых работ; и наказания для самовольных отлучников; и награды для отличившихся хозяев. В.Н. Никитин признаёт: при сопоставлении строгих обязанностей, налагаемых на евреевземледельцев, «с правами и преимуществами, данными исключительно евреям, [и] с теми, какими пользовались прочие податные сословия, —нельзя не признать, что правительство очень благоволило к ним [евреям]»³⁷.

From 1829 to 1833, "Jews diligently engaged in farming, fortune rewarded them with harvests, they were satisfied with the authorities, and the authorities were satisfied with them, and general prosperity was only disturbed by minor incidental occurrences." (After the Turkish war of 1829, like all colonists, Jewish settlers were forgiven all tax arrears for "the hardships they bore from the movement of… troops"). However, as reported by the Guardianship Committee, "the crop failure of 1833, making it impossible to keep them [the Jews] in the colonies, opened up for many of them, who lacked good will and desire to engage in rural activities, a means to sow nothing, or very little, sell livestock, wander, seek assistance, and not pay taxes." In 1834, it occurred that "the grain issued to them was sold, and the livestock slaughtered, and even those who did not have a substantial necessity did so," and the local authorities, due to difficulties in supervision, were unable to prevent "a multitude of cunning evasions by the settlers." — Crop failures among the Jews "occurred more frequently than among other settlers, because, in addition to insignificant plantings, they cultivated the land disorderly and untimely," and there was a "skill passed from one generation to another among Jews for light trades, carelessness, and negligence in livestock supervision"³⁸.

It seems: Wasn't 30 years of unfortunate experience with Jewish agriculture (even against the backdrop of global experience) enough for the Russian government to abandon these futile attempts and expenses? No! Did these dismal reports not reach Nicholas I? Were they glossed over by ministers? Or did the emperor's relentless energy and unwavering hope drive him to new attempts?…

In the new 1835 Statute on Jews (the result of the "Directorial Committee's" work), Jewish agriculture was not only not discarded but was expanded and prioritized in the organization of Jewish life: "To arrange Jews under such regulations that, while opening a free path for them to acquire a secure livelihood through engagement in agriculture and industry and for the gradual education of their youth, would at the same time block the causes of idleness and illegal trades." Previously, a preliminary contribution of 400 rubles per family was required from the Jewish community, but now "every Jew was allowed, 'at any time'… to turn to farming," and all his tax arrears were immediately consolidated and removed from him and the community; it was permitted to obtain not only state lands for indefinite use but also, within the Pale of Settlement, to buy, sell, and lease lands. Those transitioning to farming were exempted from the poll tax for 25 years, from the local tax for 10 years, and from conscription duties for 50 years. Conversely, no Jew "could be forced to transition to farming." Moreover, "trades and crafts in their rural existence" were legalized³⁹.

It's been one and a half centuries, and even an enlightened physicist remembers past Jewish life this way: "The Pale of Settlement combined with a prohibition (!) on peasant activities"⁴⁰. Meanwhile, historian and publicist M.O. Gershenzon takes a broader view: "Agriculture is forbidden to the Jew by his national spirit, because, by integrating into the land, a person is most easily bound to the place"⁴¹.

Influential Finance Minister Cancrin proposed that unused lands in Siberia be allocated for Jewish agriculture—and by the end of 1835, Nicholas I had approved the plan. It was envisioned to allocate "15 dessiatinas of arable land per male soul" to Jewish settlers in Siberia, provide agricultural tools and working livestock at the state's expense, offer ready-made log houses, cover the cost of relocation and food en route. This seemed to open an incentive for the relocation to Siberia of poor Jews burdened with large families. However, the kahals now faced a dilemma: these poor were needed to supply recruits (in place of wealthy families)—and they were not informed that all their tax arrears would be forgiven, and were initially required to make payments. But the government also reconsidered (due to the difficulties of distant resettlement; and because in Siberia, the Jews "would not have good examples of diligence and management", but would continue there "the same barren trade maintained only by deceptions, which had done so much harm to the Western region of the Empire—running taverns, ruining residents by readily indulging tendencies to drunkenness" and others). By 1837, the resettlement to Siberia was halted without public explanation of the reasons⁴².

Meanwhile, that same year, a survey in Novorossiya concluded that "the lands allocated to [Jewish] colonies and intended for new settlements 'contain chernozem [black soil] of the very best quality, very suitable for farming, and the steppes are excellent for haymaking and livestock breeding'" (the local authorities contested such findings)⁴³.

In the same year of 1837, the Ministry of State Properties was established (led by Count P.D. Kiselev), which was tasked (as a transitional measure towards the abolition of serfdom) with "guardianship over free farmers" (state peasants), who numbered 7.5 million revision souls, and thus also over Jewish farmers, of whom there were only 3-5 thousand families, "a drop in the ocean compared to the number of state peasants. Nevertheless, from the very first days of the Ministry's existence, it began to receive requests from Jews", complaints of a very diverse nature, and in great numbers. "Within six months, it became clear that exclusively catering to the Jews would take up so much time that it would unfavorably affect the Ministry's main work"⁴⁴. However, in 1840 Kiselev was also appointed as the chairman of the newly formed "Committee for Determining Measures for the Radical Transformation of Jews in Russia" (the sixth of its kind)⁴⁵—so the Jewish question was drawing him in.

In 1839, Kiselev pushed through the State Council a law allowing Jews who were in line for conscription (but with their entire family) to also become farmers, thus exempting them from conscription—a significant new benefit. In 1844, a more detailed "statute on Jewish farmers" was issued, also within the Pale of Settlement, granting them the right for the first three years to hire Christians to teach them farming. When in 1840 many Jews appeared in Novorossiya "as if at their own expense" (those who were "relocating at their own cost" at their places of origin had given written assurances that they were solvent and would not request assistance), they actually had nothing and declared en route that their funds were depleted, "and sought settlement at the state's expense." Thus, "more than 1,800 families gathered, and out of them, entire hundreds lacked documents or any solid proof of where they came from and for what reasons they ended up in Novorossiya," and they "continued to arrive continuously and pleaded not to leave them in a destitute condition." Kiselev ordered that all of them be accepted at the expense of funds allocated "for immigrants in general, regardless of their tribe." That is, he further assisted them—beyond the budgeted estimates. In 1847, "additional regulations" were issued that made it easier for Jews to transition to farming⁴⁶.

Kiselev set out with his ministry to create exemplary Jewish colonies, thereby potentially initiating "the beginning of a massive settlement of this people." He established, one after another, colonies in the Yekaterinoslav Province on fertile soils, abundant in water, near rivers and streams, with excellent pastures and hayfields—and he very much hoped that the new colonists would learn from the superior experience of German settlers (although it was difficult to find among them those willing to settle near Jewish colonies, so they decided to keep them on a salary). New appropriations flowed to these future exemplary colonies, and all kinds of arrears were forgiven. By the second year of settlement, a Jewish family was required to have a garden and one sown dessiatina, with a gradual increase in dessiatinas over the years. But they lacked experience in selecting livestock, which was entrusted to guardians. Kiselev eased the conditions of resettlement (for families with few laborers), sought ways for special agronomic training for a known number of colonists. Yet, in some families, there was little to no agronomy knowledge; they wouldn't even go out to feed the livestock in severe cold—thus each family was issued a warm sheepskin coat with a hood⁴⁷.

Meanwhile, the flow of Jewish migration into agriculture continued, especially during crop failures in the Western region. Families were often sent without the necessary number of male laborers, "kahals forcibly drove poor and decrepit individuals to settle, while keeping designated healthy ones back to more efficiently collect and pay taxes and maintain their community institutions." To prevent the influx of a mass of impoverished destitute individuals, the ministry demanded that governors in the west strictly control releases, but on the ground, groups of settlers were rushed to depart without waiting for a signal that homes were ready at the new locations. This also led to delays in transferring funds needed for the settlers on time, causing the loss of an entire agricultural year at times. In the Yekaterinoslav Province, they were unable to allocate land quickly enough for those who wanted it, and 250 families independently went to Odessa and stayed there⁴⁸.

Reports from various inspectors, from different locations, and during these years, all converged into the same chorus: "Driven to extremes, [Jews] could become farmers, even good ones, but at the first favorable change of circumstances—they always abandoned the plow, sacrificed their farms, to turn back to profiteering and other favored activities." —"For a Jew 'the primary labor is industry, the smallest, astonishing in its insignificance, but yielding great profits… A state of mind, naturally industrious, finds no satisfaction in the tranquil life of a farmer,'" "it was not their true desire to engage in agriculture; they were 'lured there initially by the abundance of the region, the insignificant Jewish population, proximity to borders, trade, and profitable industry, and then by tax exemptions, and most importantly from conscription duties'. They thought they would only need to acquire houses," and hoped to "lease the land for significant profit; while they themselves would continue in industry and trade." (They naively stated all this to the inspector.) And they "took up farming with complete distaste." Furthermore, "the very rules of religion… were 'disadvantageous for Jewish farmers'", forcing them to be inactive for long periods, for example, during the spring planting—a long Passover, and in September the Sukkot 14 days straight, when "the most intense field work is needed—field preparation and sowing", although "according to reports from educated Jews, deserving of every trust, the Scripture strictly requires only the celebration of the first and last two days". Moreover, spiritual leaders in Jewish settlements (where there were often two prayer houses—one for the Orthodox 'Mitnagdim', another for the Hasidim) "kept their co-religionists in the belief that they, as a chosen people, were not destined by fate for the hard labor of a farmer, for it is the bitter lot of a non-Jew". "They rose late, spent an hour on morning prayer, and went to work when the sun was already high in the sky", then Shabbat from Friday evening until Sunday morning⁴⁹.

Indeed, from a Jewish perspective, I.G. Orshansky concludes essentially the same thing as the inspectors: "Lease farming with hired labor… finds more sympathy among Jews than the difficult transition from profiteering to the labor of a farmer… There is a noticeably increasing tendency of Jews towards engaging in rural enterprises, predominantly in the form of leasing lands and cultivating them with hired workers." In Novorossiya, the failures of Jewish agriculture stem from "the Jews' unaccustomedness to hard physical labor and the profitability of urban industries in the South." He notes how in one settlement Jews "built a synagogue with their own hands," while in others they "with their own hands" engaged in gardening⁵⁰.

Inspector and provincial reports continued to flow in that even in the 1840s, in these new "exemplary" colonies, as in the previous ones, "the very way of life of the colonists, their occupations, and their farming lagged far behind their neighboring state and landlord peasants." In the Kherson Province in 1845, the farms of Jewish colonists were "in a very unsatisfactory state; a large part of these colonists are very poor: alienating from any soil work—not many of them cultivate the land decently, and therefore, even with good harvests, they receive very meager results," "the land in the gardens—untouched," women and children not employed on the land, "a 30-desseatina plot 'barely provided daily sustenance'." "The example of German colonists" was followed by "a very insignificant number of Jewish settlers; the majority of them showed 'a clear aversion to farming and tried to meet the requirements of the authorities only to obtain a passport for leaving later'… Much of the land they left fallow, cultivated land in patches, wherever anyone fancied… They treated livestock too carelessly… overworked horses in driving and fed them little, especially on Sabbath days," gentle cows of German breed were milked irregularly, causing them to stop producing milk. "Jewish settlers were given garden trees free of charge, "but they did not develop gardening." Houses built for them in advance—some "beautiful, dry, warm, sturdy," in other places were poorly constructed and cost dearly, but where "erected with due durability and using quality materials… due to the carelessness of Jews and their inability to maintain houses… were indeed brought to such disrepair that it was impossible to live in them without prompt repair," they had dampness that led to further destruction of the buildings, it led to diseases, many houses stood empty, several families "not related to each other, and 'given the restless character of this people and their disposition to quarrels'—this association generated endless complaints")⁵¹.

Of course, the responsibility for the unpreparedness for the great resettlement was mutual: here were the uncoordinated and delayed actions of the administration, places of poor construction of houses under poor supervision, up to abuses and embezzlement. (Which led to the dismissal of chiefs and some being prosecuted.) Here was also the unwillingness of Jewish rural elders to effectively supervise the negligent, whose setups and management were unsatisfactory; hence, the appointment of overseers from retired non-commissioned officers, whom the Jews would intoxicate and appease with bribes. Here was the inability to collect taxes from settlers—either due to incapacity, "in each community, there remained no more than 10 heads of household who could barely pay for themselves," or due to the "inherent Jewish evasion from paying duties"; over the years, arrears from them increased and were repeatedly forgiven without recovery. For unauthorized leave, a settler paid 1 kopeck per day, which was insensible to him and easily made up by city earnings. (For comparison: melamdim in the settlements received from 3 to 10 thousand rubles a year; settlements maintained a heder of houses up to 30; alongside melamdim, there were attempts to introduce elements of general education into the colonies—besides the Jewish language—Russian and arithmetic, but the "simple class of Jews was very distrustful of educational institutions established by the government")⁵².

"It became increasingly indisputable that the 'exemplary' colonies Kiselev dreamed of were nothing but a fantasy." However, although he slowed down (in 1849) the sending of new families, he did not lose hope and even in 1852 wrote a resolution: "The more difficult the task, the more persistence must be shown and one should not be discouraged by initial failures." Up until then, the overseer of the colony was not a true chief of the settlement, "subjected to… occasionally, ridicule and insolence from the settlers, who understood very well that he had no real power over them," he could only give advice to the colonists. In frustration with the failures, proposals were repeatedly made to mandate lessons for the settlers with completion in two or three days and to check compliance; to strip them of the right to manage their property freely; to completely deny them leave; and even to introduce punishments: for the 1st offense—up to 30 lashes, for the 2nd—double, for the 3rd—jail, and depending on the severity of the circumstances, conscription. (Nikitin reports, how, once known, this proposed instruction "caused such fear among the Jewish farmers that they exerted all their strength… immediately acquired livestock, agricultural tools… and demonstrated… remarkable diligence in farming and housekeeping.") But Kiselev approved a softened project (1853): "the lessons must fully correspond to the abilities and experience of those to whom they are assigned"; from the guidance on each type of work developed by the Guardianship Committee, the rural chief could only deviate in the direction of easing; for the 1st violation, no punishment was assigned, and for the 2nd and 3rd—10 and 20 lashes, no more. (Conscription of the negligent was never applied, "no one… was sent to the soldiers for neglect of farming," and in 1860 the law was completely abolished)⁵³.

Indeed, this period still belonged to the era of serfdom. But after half a century of sincere governmental efforts to engage Jews in productive labor on undeveloped land, the situation began to resemble the Arakcheev settlements—military-agricultural colonies established during the reign of Alexander I, notorious for their strict regulations and harsh conditions.

It's astonishing that the imperial power had not yet grasped the futility of all measures and the hopelessness of the entire agricultural venture.

And yet, the story did not end there.

After the introduction of the recruitment duty among the Jewish population, troubling rumors spread about the terrible new legislation being prepared by the special "Jewish Committee." However, in 1835, the final comprehensive Statute on Jews (which replaced the Statute of 1804) was issued—and it "did not impose new restrictions on Jews," as the Jewish Encyclopedia cautiously states⁵⁴. In more detail, the new Statute preserved the right of Jews "to acquire all kinds of real property, except inhabited estates, and to engage in all kinds of trade on the same terms as other Russian subjects," although only within the settlement boundary⁵⁵. The 1835 Statute protected all rights of the Jewish religion, introduced awards for rabbis and the right of the merchant class of the 1st guild. It established a reasonable age of marriage (18 and 16 years). It took measures to make Jewish clothing less distinctive, separating Jews from the surrounding population. It directed Jews towards productive ways of earning (prohibiting the sale of alcohol on credit and as a pawn for household items), allowed all types of factory activity (also the lease of distilleries). Keeping Christians in service was forbidden only for permanent services but was allowed "for short-term work," without specifying the exact duration, and "for work in factories and plants," as well as "for assistance in farming, gardening, and garden work"⁵⁶, mocking the very idea of "Jewish farming." The 1835 Statute called on Jewish youth to pursue education. There was no restriction on the admission of Jews to secondary and higher educational institutions⁵⁷. Jews who obtained a doctorate in any field of science and demonstrated exceptional abilities (still with formalities) were granted the right to civil service. (Jewish doctors had this right earlier.) Regarding local self-government—The Statute lifted previous restrictions on Jews: now they could hold positions in town councils, magistrates, and town halls "on the same basis as people of other confessions are elected to these positions." (However, some local authorities, especially in Lithuania, objected: the city head must lead the townspeople to church on certain days, and how could a Jew do this? Or a Jew as a judge when the oath is taken on the cross? The resistance was strong, and by the decree of 1836, it was established for western provinces that Jews could only occupy one-third of the positions in magistrates and town halls.)⁵⁸ Finally, in the economically acute issue related to cross-border smuggling, which undermined state interests, the Statute allowed Jews living in the border strip to remain but prohibited new settlements⁵⁹.

For a state that kept millions of its population under serfdom, everything mentioned does not stand out as a system of cruelties.

During the discussion of the Statute in the State Council, there were debates with a wide variety of opinions about the possible unrestricted admission of Jews into the Great Russian provinces. Some argued that "only with the presence of certain moral qualities and a certain level of education could Jews be allowed to settle in the interior provinces." Others objected that "Jews could bring significant benefits through their commercial and industrial activities and that competition should not be prevented by forbidding anyone to live and trade"; and "the question must be squarely faced: Can Jews be tolerated in the state? If it is decided that Jews cannot be tolerated, then they should all be expelled, rather than 'leaving this estate within the state in such a condition that would continuously provoke their dissatisfaction and complaints.' If their presence in the country must be tolerated, then they should be freed from legal restrictions" ⁶⁰.

Meanwhile, "archaic Polish privileges that allowed urban communities to establish residency restrictions for Jews" and had been rejected by Russian statehood since the time of Catherine, suddenly resurged with new force in Vilnius, and then in Kyiv. In Vilnius, this led to the prohibition of Jews from settling in certain quarters. In Kyiv, protests by the local merchants, who complained that "Jews were scandalously conducting trades and transactions within the walls of the Pechersk Monasteries… having taken over all trade establishments on Pechersk" and were "displacing Christians from the trade sphere," prompted the governor-general to achieve a ban (1827) on Jews living permanently in Kyiv — only certain categories [could] come to the city for a limited time. "As always in such cases, the government had to postpone the eviction deadline several times." The disputes reached the "directorial committee," split the State Council in half — but the Statute of 1835 confirmed by Nicholas I upheld the eviction from Kyiv. However, soon "certain categories of Jews were allowed temporary residence in the city." (And why were Jews so successful in trade competition? They often traded cheaper than Christians — settling for "a smaller profit margin than that demanded by Christians," although perhaps not without some contraband origins of the goods themselves. And the governor of Kyiv defending the Jews pointed out that "if Christians were willing to work, they would have displaced the Jews without any coercive measures.") — Thus, "in Belarus, Jews were allowed to live only in cities, in Little Russia — everywhere except Kyiv and villages owned by the state treasury, in Novorossiya — in all settlements, except for Nikolayev and Sevastopol," military ports from which Jews were expelled in those years for reasons of national security ⁶².

The Statute of 1835 allowed Jewish merchants and manufacturers to attend major fairs in the internal provinces for temporary trade, granting them certain rights to sell goods outside the Pale of Settlement ⁶³. Craftsmen also were not entirely denied access to the internal provinces, though only for a limited time. According to the 1827 regulations, "the provincial authorities outside the Pale of Settlement had the right to allow Jews a six-month stay" ⁶⁴. As Hessen writes, the Statute of 1835, "and other laws later, somewhat eased the conditions for the temporary stay of Jews outside the Pale of Settlement," and local authorities often "turned a blind eye to Jews violating restrictions" ⁶⁵. Leskov also confirms this in a note compiled at the request of a government commission: "In the 1840s" Jews "appeared in the Great Russian noble villages offering their services… They regularly moved 'among familiar masters'" in the nearby Great Russian provinces, trading and working everywhere. "From here, Jews were not only not driven away but were retained." — "Local residents consistently welcomed and sheltered Jewish craftsmen… Local authorities also everywhere tolerated them, because for them, as for other residents, the Jews represented significant conveniences" ⁶⁶. — "Jews, with the assistance of interested Christians, violated restrictive regulations. And the authorities themselves were forced to make exceptions to the laws… It got to the point where, for example, fines had to be imposed on landlords in the Great Russian provinces for hosting Jews" ⁶⁷.

Russian state authorities, partly guided by protective (especially religious) arguments about the non-mingling of Christians and Jews, faced with the economic pressure pushing Jews outside the Pale of Settlement, could neither make a clear decision nor implement it clearly in practice. The enterprising and dynamic Jewish character suffered from territorial concentration and sharp internal competition within it; for them, it was natural to spread as widely as possible. As I.G. Orshansky wrote: "The more dispersed the Jews are among the Christian population… the higher their level of prosperity" ⁶⁸.

But even in its formal scope, it's hard to dispute that the Jewish Pale of Settlement in Russia was extensive: in addition to what was inherited from the dense Jewish population in Poland—including Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev, Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev provinces (beyond the Kingdom of Poland and Courland)—expansive and fertile provinces such as Poltava, Yekaterinoslav, Chernigov, Taurida, Kherson, and Bessarabia were added, all together exceeding any European state or even a group of them. For many years, from 1804 to the mid-1830s, the rich Astrakhan and Caucasian provinces were also included—though Jews hardly relocated there, with not a single Jew registered in Astrakhan in 1824 ⁶⁹. This accounted for 15 provinces within the Pale, out of a total of 31 provinces in "inner Russia." Moreover, few of them were more populous than the typical central Russian provinces. And in terms of the Jewish share of the population, they did not exceed the Muslim share in the Urals and Volga provinces. Therefore, the constriction of Jews within the Pale was not due to their number, but to the uniformity of occupations within it. Only in vast Russia could such a boundary appear confining.

Critics argue that the vastness of the Pale is an illusion: it excludes the spaces outside of cities and small towns. However, these expanses are agricultural and were open to farming, which was available to Jews, yet they were not enticed by it; the whole debate revolved around how to adapt these areas for the wine trade. This is a distortion.

If a significant Jewish population had not moved from crowded Poland to expansive Russia, the concept of the "Pale of Settlement" would not have emerged. In crowded Poland, they would have lived densely, in close quarters, and more impoverished, multiplying rapidly and almost without productive labor, with 80% of the population engaged in petty trade and intermediation.

In any case, forced ghettos for Jews, which were known throughout Europe, were not established in Russian cities. (Although in Moscow, for visitors, there was the Glebovskoye courtyard.)

If we recall again that this boundary existed for two-thirds of a century alongside serfdom, which subjected the majority of the Russian population while Jews were not, then in comparison, the oppression of this movement restriction does not appear so grim. In the Russian Empire, many peoples, in the millions, lived densely within their regions. Within the confines of a multi-national state, peoples often live segregated and densely populated. This includes the Karaites and Mountain Jews, who had the freedom to resettle but did not use it. — And this was incomparably different from the territorial restrictions, "reservations," that foreign colonizers (Anglo-Saxons, Spaniards) imposed on the indigenous populations of conquered lands.

But it was precisely the lack of their own national territory for Jews, and given their dynamic movement, their high economic pragmatism and activity, that promised to soon become a major factor influencing the entire life of Russia. It can be said that the need of the Jewish diaspora to have access to all existing places, and the fears of the breakthrough of this activity, fueled the protective measures of the Russian government.

Yes, Jews in Russia mostly avoided farming. More commonly, they were craftsmen — tailors, cobblers, watchmakers, jewelers. However, their productive activities were not limited to just small crafts, even with the constraints imposed by the settlement boundary.

The pre-revolutionary Jewish Encyclopedia writes that for Jews, before the development of large-scale industry, "money trading holds the greatest significance, regardless of whether the Jew acts as a usurer-lender or money changer, a lessee of state and landowner revenues or a banker, an innkeeper or a lessor primarily engaged in monetary operations." Even during the period of natural economy in Russia, "there was already a demand for money growing in scale" ⁷⁰. From this stemmed the transition of Jewish capital into industry for further growth there. Already under Alexander I, energetic measures were taken to encourage Jewish participation in industry, particularly in cloth production. "This later played a significant role in the accumulation of capital in the hands of Jews," and "subsequently, Jews did not fail to apply these capitals in large-scale factory and mining industries, in transportation and banking. Thus began the process of forming a Jewish middle and large bourgeoisie" ⁷¹. — The Regulation of 1835 "also contains benefits for Jewish manufacturers" ⁷².

By the 1840s, the sugar industry had developed significantly in the Southwestern region. Jewish capitalists initially subsidized the sugar factories owned by the nobility, then took over their management, and eventually their ownership, before building their own factories. Thus, in Ukraine and New Russia, powerful "sugar kings" emerged, such as Lazar and Lev Brodsky. Moreover, "the majority of Jewish sugar manufacturers began their careers as [wine] leaseholders and owners of drinking establishments." — A similar pattern emerged in the flour milling industry ⁷³.

At the time, no contemporaries understood or could foresee the formidable material and subsequently spiritual force that was developing here. Of course, neither did Nicholas I himself comprehend or see it. He had an exaggerated perception of both the omnipotence of Russian imperial authority and the effectiveness of military-administrative methods.

But he persistently desired success in the education of Jews—to overcome the Jewish alienation from the main population, which he saw as the primary danger. Already in 1831, he instructed the "Directorate Committee" that "among the measures that could improve the condition of the Jews, attention should be paid to reforming their education… establishing factories, prohibiting early marriages, better organization of kahals… changing their clothing" ⁷⁴. In 1840, with the establishment of the "Committee for Determining Measures for the Fundamental Transformation of Jews in Russia," one of the first goals the Committee saw was: "To act on the moral education of the new generation of Jews by establishing Jewish schools in a spirit contrary to the current Talmudic teaching" ⁷⁵.

General education schools were desired by all contemporary Jewish progressives of the time (the only disagreement was whether to exclude the Talmud entirely from the curriculum or to study the Talmud in the higher grades of these schools "scientifically illuminated and thus freed from harmful accretions")⁷⁶. — Here, a newly published Jewish school in Riga with a general education program was headed by Max Lilienthal, a young graduate of the University of Munich. He was eager to "promote enlightenment among Russian Jewry." In 1840, he was warmly received in St. Petersburg by the ministers of education and internal affairs, and for the "Committee for the Transformation of the Jews," he drafted projects for a Jewish consistory and a spiritual seminary—to prepare rabbis and teachers "on general, purified moral foundations" in opposition to "ossified Talmudists"; however, "before affirming the main principles of faith, secular subjects were not allowed to be taught." The ministerial project was modified: to increase the number of hours allocated for teaching Jewish subjects⁷⁷. — Lilienthal also urged the government to take preventive measures against the Hasidim, but found no support: the government "desired an external unification of hostile social elements" within Jewry⁷⁸. — Meanwhile, Lilienthal, who had "amazingly successful" set up the school in Riga, was tasked by the ministry to travel through the provinces of the Pale of Settlement and through public meetings and encounters with Jewish community leaders to aid the goals of enlightenment. His journey was outwardly very successful, generally not meeting open hostility and seemingly persuading the influential layers of Jewry. "Opponents… of reform had to… display outward" approval. But of course, the hidden resistance was enormous. And when the school reform itself finally began, Lilienthal abandoned his mission. In 1844 he suddenly left for the United States, and forever. "His departure from Russia… — if not a flight — is shrouded in mystery"⁷⁹.

Thus, under Nicholas I, the authorities not only did not hinder the assimilation of Jews, but actually encouraged it—however, the masses, remaining under the influence of the kahal and fearing coercive measures in the realm of religion, did not follow through.

However, the school reform began in its own turn from 1844, despite the extreme opposition of the governing circles of the kahals. (Although "the establishment of Jewish schools was by no means intended to reduce the number of Jews in general educational institutions; on the contrary, it was repeatedly pointed out that general schools should continue to be open to Jews"⁸⁰.) Two types of state Jewish schools were established ("modeled after Austrian elementary schools for Jews"⁸¹): two-year schools, corresponding to Russian parish schools, and four-year schools, corresponding to district schools. In them, only Jewish subjects were taught by Jewish teachers (and in Hebrew), while general subjects were taught by Russians. (As assessed by the fierce revolutionary Lev Deich: "The crowned monster ordered them [Jews] to be taught the Russian alphabet"⁸².) For many years, Christians were placed at the head of these schools, and only much later—Jews.

"The majority of the Jewish population, faithful to traditional Judaism, learning or guessing the secret intent of Uvarov [the Minister of Education], viewed the government's educational measures as a form of persecution" ⁸³. (Uvarov himself, seeking ways to integrate Jews with the Christian population by eradicating the "prejudices instilled by the teachings of the Talmud," intended to exclude it from education altogether, considering it an anti-Christian code ⁸⁴.) — Amid persistent distrust of Russian authority, the Jewish population for many years shunned these schools, experiencing "schoolophobia": "Just as the population avoided conscription, it escaped from schools, fearing to send their children to these hotbeds of 'freethinking'." Wealthy Jewish families often sent other people's children, from the poorer strata, to state schools in place of their own ⁸⁵. (This is exactly how P.B. Axelrod was sent to a state school; he then moved on to a gymnasium, and later to well-known political prominence—as a comrade of Plekhanov and Deich in the 'Emancipation of Labor' ⁸⁶.) And if by 1855 there were 70,000 Jewish children attending 'registered' cheders, then in state schools of both types there were only 3,200 ⁸⁷.

This fear of secular education remained in Judaism for a long time. Lev Deich recalls that even in the 1860s, and not in some backwater, but in Kiev: "I vividly remember the time when my fellow Jews considered it sinful to learn Russian" and only allowed it "for dealings with… 'gentiles'" ⁸⁸. — G.B. Sliozberg recalls that even in the 1870s, entering a gymnasium was considered a betrayal of Jewish essence; a gymnasium uniform was a sign of apostasy. — "Between Jews and Christians lay an abyss, which only individual Jews could cross, and even then only in major cities, where Jewish public opinion did not constrain personal will to [such an] extent" ⁸⁹. — Jewish youth did not rush to study at Russian universities, although graduating from them gave Jews, according to the conscription law of 1827, a lifetime exemption from military service. — However, Hessen notes that in the "more affluent circles" of Russian Jewry, there was an "increasing voluntary inclination… towards general educational institutions" ⁹⁰.

And yet, in government-funded Jewish schools, "not only the Christian supervisors but also, in most cases, the Jewish teachers who taught Jewish subjects in German, were not up to par." Therefore, "along with the establishment of public schools, it was decided to set up a higher school for teacher training… to create a cadre of more educated rabbis who would act in a progressive direction on the popular masses. Such 'rabbinical schools' were established in Vilnius and Zhitomir (1847)."—"Despite all their shortcomings, the schools brought some benefits," testifies the liberal Yu.I. Gessen,—"the younger generation began to learn Russian speech and literacy."—And revolutionary M. Kral agrees, although with an obligatory wholesale condemnation of the government: "As reactionary and hostile to Jews as Nicholas I's laws on Jewish public primary and rabbinical schools were, these schools involuntarily introduced a small portion of Jewish children to secular education." And the "maskilim" (enlightened ones), now despising "the superstitions of the masses"—"had nowhere to go" and remained among their own as strangers. "Yet this movement played a huge role in the spiritual awakening of Russian Jewry in the second half of the 19th century." But those among the maskilim who wanted to enlighten the Jewish masses faced "the embittered resistance of fanatically devout Jews, who saw secular education as a demonic temptation" ⁹².

In 1850, another layer was added: the institute of "learned Jews," inspectors-consultants at the guardians of educational districts.

Starting in 1857, graduates of the newly established rabbinical schools were appointed to the role of "government rabbis," reluctantly chosen by their communities and subject to approval by provincial authorities. However, their duties were largely administrative; Jewish communities considered them uninformed in Jewish scholarship. Traditional rabbis remained as "spiritual rabbis," who were considered the true religious leaders. Many graduates of rabbinical schools, finding neither rabbinic nor teaching positions, went on to further their education at universities, pursuing careers in medicine and law⁹³.

Throughout his reign, Nicholas I never lost his zeal for regulating the internal life of the Jewish community. The kahal, which already wielded enormous power over the community, gained even more strength from the moment the conscription duty was introduced, receiving the right to "conscript any Jew at any time for tax delinquency, vagrancy, and other disorders intolerable in Jewish society," and it used this power with bias, favoring the wealthy. "All this led to mass unrest against the kahal leaders, created tense relations within the community, and became one of the reasons for the kahal's ultimate decline." Thus, in 1844, kahals were universally abolished, and their functions transferred to city administrations and town halls, ostensibly aligning the situation in Jewish urban communities with national uniformity. However, this reform was not completed: the collection of perpetually delinquent taxes and the provision of recruits were again entrusted to the Jewish community, whose now "recruit elders" and "collectors" inherited the roles of former kahal leaders. Metric books, and thus the population registry, remained in the hands of the rabbis⁹⁵.

The Russian government under Nicholas I intervened in the complex issue of internal Jewish community levies, primarily the "korobka" tax (an indirect tax on the consumption of kosher meat). A 1844 decree specified that the korobka revenue should be partly used to cover the community's government arrears, to fund Jewish schools, and to provide aid to Jews transitioning to agriculture⁹⁶. However, an unexpected issue arose: although the Jewish population was subject to a personal tax, similar to Christian townspeople (a direct tax), the korobka tax effectively placed them in a somewhat privileged position regarding the method of tax payment. Now, "Jews, including the affluent circles, often covered only a small portion of the government levies through personal contributions, transferring the rest into arrears"—and these arrears kept accumulating, exceeding 8 million rubles by the mid-1850s. This led to a new stern imperial decree: "for every additional two thousand rubles" of arrears, "one adult recruit" was to be taken⁹⁷.

In 1844, another vigorous but ultimately unsuccessful attempt was made to evict Jews from the villages.

Hessen poetically writes that in the Russian "laws intended to regulate the lives of Jews, one can almost hear a cry of despair that, despite all its power, the government cannot uproot Jewish existence from the depths of Russian life"⁹⁸.

No, the rulers of Russia had not yet fully grasped the entire burden and seemingly unsolvable problem of the vast Jewish legacy acquired from the partitions of Poland: what to do with this rapidly growing and stubbornly persistent organism within the Russian state body? They did not find confident solutions and certainly could not foresee the consequences. One vigorous measure after another was implemented by Nicholas I, yet the situation only seemed to become more complicated.

A similar escalating failure haunted Nicholas I in his efforts to combat Jewish cross-border smuggling. In 1843, he categorically ordered the expulsion of all Jews from a 50-verst border zone along Austria and Prussia, despite the fact that "in some border customs, the trading merchant class consisted almost entirely of Jews"⁹⁹. The planned measure was immediately adjusted with broad exemptions from the rule: initially granting a two-year period to sell real estate, followed by an extension of this period. Migrants were offered financial assistance to settle in new locations, and they were also exempted from taxes for the next five years. The resettlement did not commence for several years, and soon "Nicholas I's government ceased to insist on the expulsion of Jews from the 50-verst border zone, and some of them were able to remain in their previous locations"¹⁰⁰.

Here, Nicholas received another warning, the scope and consequences of which for all of Russia he likely did not grasp: this threatened and far from implemented measure of border expulsion, prompted by smuggling that had grown to dangerous proportions for the state, elicited such indignation in Europe that it arguably this very decree of 1843 sharply alienated European public opinion from Russia. In other words, perhaps this specific decree from 1843 marks the beginning of the era of European Jewry's influence in defending their coreligionists in Russia—an active influence that has since not ceased.

This new attention was undoubtedly manifested by the visit of Sir Moses Montefiore to Russia in 1846, with a letter of recommendation to Nicholas from Queen Victoria and the mission to achieve "improvement in the plight of the Jewish population" in Russia. He traveled through some cities densely populated by Jews; later, from England, he sent a comprehensive letter to the Tsar proposing to entirely free Jews from restrictive legislation, grant "equality with all other subjects" (excluding, of course, serf peasants), and "as soon as possible: abolish restrictions on the right of residence and movement within the Pale of Settlement," allow merchants and craftsmen to travel to the interior provinces, "permit the employment of Christians, restore the kahal…"¹⁰¹.

On the contrary, Nicholas did not lose his drive to impose his order on Jewish life. He resembled Peter the Great in his determination to authoritatively shape the entire state and society according to his plan, simplifying the complexities of society into clear, easily understood categories—just as Peter once "cleared out" everything that disrupted the clear grouping of taxable estates.

Now, the measure was the analysis of the Jewish townspeople population. This project emerged in 1840 during the consideration of the general task of overcoming the religious-national alienation of Jews (with considerations from Levinson, Feigin about "common civil life", as well as "the absence of any useful labor among Jews and harmful activities in their petty industry, accompanied by all kinds of deceptions and tricks"). These "idleness" of many Jews was attributed by government circles to their "entrenched habits", believing that the Jewish "mass could find work but refuses certain types of labor due to traditions"¹⁰².

And Minister Count Kiselyov proposed to the Sovereign the following measure: without affecting the well-established Jewish merchants, to address the Jewish townspeople, specifically — to classify them into two categories: the first to include those who have permanent residency and property, and the second to include those who do not, and to give them a 5-year period to become either guild craftsmen or farmers. (A craftsman was considered someone who joined a guild permanently; a settled townsman was someone who joined a guild temporarily¹⁰³.) Those who do not achieve this in 5 years and remain in their previous state were to be considered "useless" and subjected to a special military-labor obligation: to draft them as recruits (from the age of 20) at three times the normal rate, but not for the usual 25 years of military service, only for 10 years, and during this time "to use them in the army and navy primarily in various crafts, and then, according to their wishes, to convert them into guild craftsmen or into farmers"—that is, to provide them with compulsory vocational training. However, the government had no funds for this and saw no alternative but to use the box tax, as the Jewish community could not but be interested in the employment of its members¹⁰⁴.

In 1840, Nicholas I approved this project. (The term "useless Jews" was replaced with "those lacking productive labor.") All measures for the transformation of Jewish life were consolidated into a single decree, and the following sequence was established: 1) "organization of the box tax collection [and] abolition of the kahal"; 2) establishment of general education schools for Jews; 3) establishment of "provincial rabbis"; 4) "settlement of Jews on state lands" for farming; 5) classification; 6) prohibition of wearing traditional long Jewish clothing. — Kiselyov envisioned the "classification" in the not-so-immediate future, but Nicholas moved it ahead of farming, which had been unsuccessful for a third of a century¹⁰⁵.

However, the "classification" included a preliminary five-year period for choosing occupations, and the announcement of the measure itself only occurred in 1846, so the actual "classification" was not to begin until January 1852. (In 1843, the Governor-General of New Russia, Count M. Vorontsov, protested against the "classification", writing that the occupation of this "numerous class of small traders and middlemen… has been slandered", and that "[80%] of the Jewish population" were classified as "useless" — meaning that 80% of Jews were predominantly engaged in trade. However, Vorontsov hoped that, given the broad economic conditions of the New Russia region, it would be possible to manage without any coercive measures, there was no need to evict Jews from the villages, but rather to enhance education among them. He also warned of potential European indignation over the "classification"¹⁰⁶.

Yes, having been burned by how the attempt to expel Jews from the border zone was received in Europe, the Russian government, now in 1846, compiled a reasoned notification about the new measure: that Jews did not have citizenship or the right to own real estate in Poland and were forced to limit their activity to petty trade and tavern-keeping; but upon transitioning to Russia, the boundaries of Jewish settlement were expanded, they received civil rights, entry into the urban commercial estate, the right to own real estate, the right to engage in agriculture, and the right to education, including universities and academies¹⁰⁷.

And it must be acknowledged that indeed Jews received all of this during the first few decades of their stay in the so-called "prison of nations." However, a century later, in a review collection by Jewish authors, this will be assessed as follows: "Upon the annexation of Polish regions and their Jewish population to Russia, promises of rights were given and attempts were made to fulfill these promises (italicized by me. —A.S.; promises were fulfilled; attempts were successful). But at the same time, mass expulsions from villages began (indeed started, but were never realized), double taxation (consistently not collected and soon abolished), and the establishment of the Pale of Settlement" ¹⁰⁸—we saw that, given the circumstances of the late 18th century, the boundaries of the settlement were initially a geographic inheritance. If such a portrayal of history is considered objective—then it is impossible to agree on the truth.

But, unfortunately, the government notification of 1846 further stated, the Jews did not take advantage of much of this: "Constantly averse to merging with the civil society in which they live, they largely remained at their previous ways of existence at the expense of others' labor, and hence justifiable complaints arise from the local residents." "Therefore, in order to [improve the well-being of the Jews]… it is necessary to remove them from the dependency" on the community elders, inheriting the former Kahal leadership, to spread education and practical knowledge among the Jewish population, establish special Jewish general education schools, provide means for transitioning to agriculture, and eliminate the "unpleasant for many Jews" distinction in clothing. And "the government believes it has the right to hope that the Jews will cease all condemnable ways of life and turn to truly productive and useful labor." Only those who evade this will be subjected to "coercive measures, as idlers and as burdensome and harmful members of society" ¹⁰⁹.

In response, Montefiore condemned the proposed "sorting" measure, insisting that the whole problem was due to restrictions on Jewish movement and their trade. Nicholas countered that if the Jews' turn to productive labor proved successful, time "will naturally lead to a gradual reduction of restrictions" ¹¹⁰. He hoped for reeducation through labor… Facing defeat in transforming Jewish life in various ways, he intended to open up Jewish insularity and solve the problem of integrating the Jewish population with others—through labor, and to labor—through an intensively enforced conscription.

At the same time, the specifically reduced military service term for Jews (from 25 years to 10), and the goals of vocational training, were not apparent, and what was really felt was the conscription intake, now tripled compared to Christians—"10 recruits per 1,000 men annually (for Christians—7 per 1,000 every other year)" ¹¹¹.

In response to the intensified conscription, draft arrears increased. Those designated for conscription hid from their communities. In response (end of 1850), an order followed: for each recruit not delivered on time, three additional recruits were to be taken beyond the arrears! Now Jewish communities and draft elders became very interested in catching deserters, or substituting them with any other unaccounted individuals. (In 1853, "rules were issued allowing Jewish communities and private individuals to substitute any caught person without a passport for their own recruits.") In Jewish communities, hired "catchers," or "khapuny," emerged who captured "catches" ¹¹²—those who indeed evaded conscription, or those with expired passports, even if from another province, or a homeless teenager—and received a receipt for their capture that credited the hiring community.

Yet all these measures did not compensate for the shortfall in recruits. In 1852, two more orders were added: one stipulated that for each extra recruit delivered by a community, 300 rubles of their tax arrears would be written off ¹¹³; the other aimed "to stop the harboring of Jews from military duty," demanding severe punishment for those who fled conscription, fining the communities where they were sheltered, and in lieu of the missing recruits, taking their relatives or community leaders responsible for timely recruit delivery into service. Trying to avoid conscription by all means, many Jews fled abroad or moved to other provinces ¹¹⁴.

The recruitment frenzy intensified: the bounty hunters became even more ruthless, while, conversely, the healthy and capable fled and hid, causing the community arrears to only increase. There were also protests and petitions from the settled, productive part of the community, arguing that if the conscription rate was set equally for both the "useful" and those lacking productive labor, the unsettled would always have the opportunity to hide, and the entire burden would fall on the "useful," leading them to disruption and ruin ¹¹⁵.

Administrative tightening led to obvious absurdities, not to mention the growing tension among the entire Jewish population—especially with the impending "classification" process.

The actual "classification" process, however, still did not begin due to emerging difficulties, such as doubts about the value of certain types of labor: whether they were "useful" or not. This caused tension in the St. Petersburg offices¹¹⁶. The State Council requested a delay in the "classification" until the rules about guilds were developed, but the Sovereign disagreed. In 1851, "Temporary Rules on the Classification of Jews" were published, and in 1852, "Special Rules on Jewish Craft Guilds" were issued to protect them. The Jewish population lived in great anxiety, but according to the testimony of the governor-general of the Southwest region, they no longer believed that the "classification" would take place¹¹⁷.

Indeed, the "classification… was not implemented; the Jewish population was not actually divided into categories"¹¹⁸. In February 1855, Nicholas I suddenly died, and the "classification" was permanently discontinued.

In the 1850s, Nicholas I became excessively self-confident, made gross mistakes, and foolishly dragged us into the Crimean War against a coalition of powers, — and he died suddenly in the midst of it.

Indeed, the sudden death of the Emperor similarly liberated the Jews in a difficult time, just as a century later, the death of Stalin did.

Thus concluded the first 60 years of the mass presence of Jews in Russia. It must be acknowledged that such an ancient, deeply-rooted, and complex problem was not something the Russian authorities of that time were prepared for, nor were they sufficiently insightful to handle it effectively. However, to label the Russian rulers as "persecutors of Jews" distorts their intentions and exaggerates their capabilities.